Author: Abbing, Hans

Publication Year: 1979

Media Type: Conference paper/presentation

Summary:

Paper presented at First International Conference on Arts and Economics, sponsored by the Association for Cultural Economics, held in Edinburgh, Scotland, August 8-10, 1979.

Abstract:

Paper presented at First International Conference on Arts and Economics, sponsored by the Association for Cultural Economics, held in Edinburgh, Scotland, August 8-10, 1979. Comment by F.F. Ridley appears on p. 42-46.

Up to now economists have justified public subsidies to the arts in one of two ways; they claim either that people underestimate the importance to themselves of art consumption, considering that the arts are subsidized in order to educate people, or that the next generations have to be protected against our barbaric attitudes toward the arts.

Apart from special cases, neither of these two arguments is satisfactory. Both presuppose an underconsumption of the arts, and this presumption is unrealistic. Although art consumption has never been very extensive, it is increasing steadily and is now more extensive than ever, particularly when we take into account the impact of technical reproductions.

Thus, the arguments are based on an unrealistic assumption about the consumption of art. On the one hand, they explicitly move the arts into a position of exceptionality, a position contemporary artists want to get rid of, and since the majority of economists favor as little interference with public preferences as possible, they resent patronizing motives. So as long as different arguments are lacking, economists will be likely to oppose most public subsidies for the arts.

But what about externalities? Sometimes the second argument (protecting the next generation) is cast in terms of external effects; that is, people do not consume art but still wish to preserve it. The free riders, however, prevent them from realizing this preference spontaneously, so government intervention is required. In this way we drop the unattractive argument of meritocracy for one concerning externalities. My impression is that Peacock thinks this is about the only valid argument for public support (Peacock 1969). In actual practice we can find evidence for the existence of such a preference. We observe campaigns for the preservation of one thing or another and we come across legacies left to the community. Sometimes externalities of a more pedestrian nature have been noted, mostly to supplement the previous arguments. Examples include contributions to tourism, national prestige, and local industrial activity. Much could be said about these alleged external effects, but insofar as they are valid, they cannot be more than supplementary. In addition, careful examination will lead one to acknowledge several less pedestrian external effects, which are, however, limited in scope. The performing arts serving as training grounds for the mass media, as mentioned by Baumol and Bowen, is a nice example of this class of externalities (Baumol and Bowen, 1966, p. 385, note).

All the foregoing external effects have one thing in common. They bear no relation to the precise characteristics of art products and the way in which they are consumed. They are general and could apply to any product. In this paper I intend to show that there exists a category of externalities which is more or less tied to the art product and which may be very important in a rationale for public support of the arts. I will demonstrate that the salability of most art products is very limited, always has been, and always will be. Therefore, the possibilities of gaining a proper income in the market are also very limited for most artists. The reason is not a shortage in demand but the typical characteristics of the art product. Most art products can be and actually are marketed in a physical sense, but this only tends to obscure the fact that usually many aspects - often the most important aspects - of a work of art can be and are consumed freely. Contrary to their outward appearance, many art products behave like public goods. This implies that they should be financed like public goods, mainly through public funds.

Even if one goes along with the argument, it still does not necessarily imply the necessity of public support. In other spheres of economic activity similar phenomena exist without such a necessity. So I intend to show that there are important differences between art products and other goods, as well as differences in development costs of innovations and in the possibilities of protecting these innovations. (p. 34-35)

CONTENTS
Exact reproduction and circulation of works of art.
Translations, variations, and other derivatives of works of art.
Popularizing reproductions.
The influence of the artist upon other artists.
Applications in commercial design.
The reproduction of views inherent in works of art.
Social functions of the arts: an unnecessary extra.
The rationale of public support.
Notes.
References [bibliography].

Arts & Intersections:

Categories: Funding